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What external control mechanisms are most effective in detecting corporate fraud?  To address this
question we study in depth all reported cases of corporate fraud in companies with more than 750 million
dollars in assets between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on one single mechanism,
but on a wide range of, often improbable, actors. Only 6% of the frauds are revealed by the SEC and
14% by the auditors. More important monitors are media (14%), industry regulators (16%), and employees
(19%).  Before SOX, only 35% of the cases were discovered by actors with an explicit mandate. After
SOX, the performance of mandated actors improved, but still account for only slightly more than 50%
of the cases. We find that monetary incentives for detection in frauds against the government influence
detection without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting gains from extending such incentives to corporate
fraud more generally.
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The large and numerous corporate frauds that emerged in the United States at the 
onset of the new millennium provoked an immediate legislative response in the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX). This law was predicated upon the idea that the existing institutions 
designed to uncover fraud (e.g., the auditors) had failed, and their incentives as well as 
their monitoring should be increased.  The political imperative to act quickly prevented 
any empirical analysis to substantiate the law’s premises.  Which actors play a role in 
deterring corporate fraud through detection?  What motivates them?  Did reforms target 
the right actors and change the situation?  Can detection be improved in a more cost 
effective way? 
To answer these questions we gather data on a comprehensive sample of alleged 
corporate frauds in the United States that took place between 1996 and 2004 in 
companies with more than 750 million dollars in assets. After screening for frivolous 
suits, we end up with a sample of 230 cases of alleged corporate frauds, which include all 
of the high profile cases such as Enron, HealthSouth, and World Com.
1 
Through an extensive reading of each fraud’s history, we identify who is involved 
in the revelation of the fraud, and what are the circumstances that lead to its detection.  
Using data on the fraud duration we study the timing of revelation to infer which 
mechanisms are more efficient in revealing fraud.   To understand better why these fraud 
detectors are active, we study the sources of information and the incentives detectors face 
in bringing the fraud to light. To identify the role played by short sellers, we look for 
unusual levels of short positions before a fraud emerges.  
                                                 
1 In that follows we will drop the term alleged and simply refer to fraud.  While a number of these cases 
have settled with findings of fact of fraud, the majority of them settled for financial payment without any 
admittance of wrongdoing and hence, from a legal point of view, remains allegations.   2
We find that no specific actor dominates the revelation of fraud. Even using the 
most comprehensive and generous interpretation, shortsellers and equity holders revealed 
the fraud  in only 9 percent of the cases. Financial analysts and auditors do a little better 
(each accounting for 14 percent of the cases), but they hardly dominate the scene. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accounts for only 6 percent of detected 
frauds by external actors. More surprising is the key role played by actors who lack a 
direct role in investment markets, such as the the media (14 percent), non-financial-
market regulators (16 percent), and employees (19 percent).   
As interesting as who detects corporate fraud are who did not.  Stock exchange 
regulators, commercial banks, and underwriters are notable for their complete absence.  
Also, private security litigation plays a minimal role (less than 2 percent) in the detection 
of fraud.  This does not mean that it is useless to prevent fraud, since it could be the 
mechanism through which people committing fraud are forced to pay for their mistakes.  
But it does suggest that this mechanism cannot work alone.  It needs another (vast) set of 
institutions to help bring fraud to light. 
Another way to measure the relative efficiency of those actors, besides the 
frequency, is to look at the average speed with which these actors bring fraud to light. 
Financial analysts and short sellers are in a league of their own, taking only a median 
duration of 9.1 months to reveal fraud. These are the players whose market role is closest 
to a financial monitoring mechanism. Frauds that make it through these monitors are then 
caught by those with a significant stake in the firm: external equity holders (15.9 
months), suppliers, clients and competitors (13.3 months). Non financial market 
regulators and auditors also seem to intervene at a similar speed (respectively 13.3 and   3
14.7 months).  Finally, for frauds that persist longer, revelation of the fraud is left to 
actors with weaker access to the firm, namely, the media (21.0 months), the SEC (21.2 
months), and professional service firms like plaintiff lawyers (31.4 months), or to 
employee whistleblowers (20.9 months). 
Having identified the whistle blowers, we then investigate the cost-benefit trade 
offs they face. Despite their acitivity, analysts, journalists, auditing firms, and employees 
who bring fraud to light do not seem to be rewarded in monetary or in career terms.  
Direct payment is made extremely unlikely by insider trading laws that constrain 
individuals with material inside information from profiting directly by shorting the stock 
themselves.  Thus, we search for other indications of rewards.  If detection were a high 
payoff activity, we would expect those revealing frauds to be the young aggressive types 
looking to use revealing fraud to promote their careers. By contrast, we find that 59 
percent of analysts’ detections are done by more seasoned analysts working at top 10 
investment banks. In newspapers, almost all the fraud revelations are published in top 
newspapers by established journalists.   
We do, on the other hand, identify real costs to blowing the whistle. Conditional 
on a fraud being committed, auditing firms are more likely to lose the job when they 
reveal it than when they do not. In 45 % of the cases, the employee blowing the whistle 
does not identify him or herself individually and in 82% of cases with named employees, 
the individual alleges that they were fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered 
responsibilities as a result of bringing the fraud to light.  
  Generalizing from these results on the identity and incentives of fraud detectors, 
we arrive at what might be called a paradox of whistle blowing: those with the weakest   4
incentives to blow the whistle (e.g. employees) are most active, while those with the 
strongest incentives to act (e.g. shortsellers) are surprisingly less frequent actors. This 
paradox can be understood if we espouse Hayek’s (1945) view that information is 
diffuse.   Actors with weak incentives have an advantage in whistle blowing because they 
have superior access to information about the fraud. So, despite having weak incentives, 
actors with access to information eventually bring frauds to light.  In contrast, those with 
incentives apparently have difficulty accessing credible information to act upon.   
  In fact, our data reveal the relative merits of two fundamental approaches to fraud 
detection.  The first, which we label the “mandatory” approach, relies on entrusting some 
individuals with the task of collecting information that might lead to the detection of 
fraud. This category includes auditors, the SEC, and also possibly non-financial-market 
regulators.  These actors are generally paid for the effort they exert, not for the outcome 
they achieve.  The alternative approach, which we label the “market” approach, does not 
designate ex ante the people in charge of detecting fraud. By contrast, it provides a 
reward system for people who bring fraud to light. These incentives can be monetary, as 
in the case of shortsellers, or reputational, as in the case for the financial analyst who 
exposes a problem in her report. Overall, mandatory approaches to fraud detection 
account for only 35% of our sample, whereas market based institutions account for a 
much bigger portion, 65%, of our sample.  
This overall performance, however, obscures a dramatic change after 2002. While 
prior to July 2002, the market-based approach accounted for 73% of detections, the 
proportion declined to 46% of detected frauds after July 2002. As we explain in section 5,   5
this likely is a direct consequence of a series of changes (including the passage of SOX) 
that focused on increasing the incentives and the penalties for the mandated actors.  
Since a Hayekian view of the challenge of fraud detection seems to fit our data 
best, particularly prior to 2002, we also consider an alternative strategy to the US current 
regulatory focus on mandated actors:  sharpen the incentives of those actors who are 
endowed with information via a direct payment contingent on the revelation of a fraud. 
Specifically, we examine the impact of the only notable monetary reward for fraud 
detection in our sample – monetary awards through the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 
(also know as qui tam statute).   In the situation where the fraud involves a false claim 
against the government, individuals who bring forward information that identifies the 
fraud and allows the government to successfully pursue a suit against the company are 
entitled to between 15 and 30 percent of the money recovered by the government.  
Consistent with this monetary incentive impacting behavior, we find that in healthcare(an 
industry where the government accounts for a significant percentage of revenue and thus 
such suits are more likely) 46.7% of frauds are brought to light by employees. This 
contrasts   with only 16.3% of cases detected by employees in all other industries. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, a strong monetary incentive 
to blow the whistle does motivate people with information to come forward.  
One possible concern with such incentives is that they might be too strong and 
lead to an excessive amount of frivolous suits.  In the healthcare industry, however, we 
do not find any evidence of that, since the percentage of frivolous suits (suits dismissed 
or settled for less than 3 million) is lower, not higher, in that industry.    6
By contrast, the non monetary incentives for employee whistleblowers introduced 
by SOX do not lead to an increased rate of detection by employees. In fact, in our sample 
employee whistleblowing  drops from 20.7%  to 15.6% of cases after SOX. 
Our work is related to a large literature in accounting and finance that looks at the 
characteristics of firms involved in fraud (e.g. Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002), Burns 
and Kedia (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006)) , the impact of fraudulent 
financial reporting on firm value (e.g. Palmrose and Schotz (2004)) and the role of 
specific whistleblower types including the press (Miller (2006)) and employee 
whistleblowers (Bowen, Call and Rajgopal (2007)). We differ in our focus: comparing 
the relative importance of difference sources of detection. We also differ in the broadness 
of our sample that includes both accounting related and non-accounting related frauds.   
Our work is also related to a significant literature in law and economics.  As Choi 
(2004), Griffin, Grundfest and Perino (2001), and Thompson and Sale (2003)), we use 
federal securities class actions to construct the sample of fraud. The focus of these papers, 
however, is on the frequency and the cost imposed by fraud, not on the alternative 
mechanisms of detection. In this respect, our work is closer to Black (2001) and Coffee 
(2001), who discuss the best mechanisms to protect investors from fraud and raise 
questions whether specific actors are best thought of as reputation intermediaries who 
take an active role in policing the system or more simply as transaction engineers who 
attend to the concerns of their clients. Our paper provides data that sheds light on these 
questions.  
Finally, our analysis reveals mechanisms that bring fraud to light that are not part 
of the standard analysis of corporate governance, which has typically emphasized the role   7
of boards (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)) and the presence of large shareholders 
(Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)). Since corporate fraud can be seen as the ultimate 
form of mismanagement, in this sense, our paper is related to a large literature on the real 
effect of bad corporate governance (Becht et al, (2003), and Morck, Wolfenzon and 
Yeung (2005) provide summaries of this literature).  
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 explains the data and 
sample selection process. Section 2 analyzes the mechanisms that contribute to fraud 
detection and their relative efficiency in terms of time it takes them to bring a fraud to 
light.  Section 3 analyzes the costs and benefits of whistle-blowing faced by market-based 
actors. Section 4 explores the changes in environment occurred after 2002 and their 
effects on the relative frequency of different whistleblowers. Section 5 summarizes the 
lesson we can draw from our analysis, while section 6 concludes. 
 
1.   Data 
1.1   Sample of Frauds 
The ideal sample for evaluating fraud detection would include all firms where the 
company and/or its officers engaged in fraud. Of course, any sample of observed frauds 
has the bias of excluding frauds never caught and excluding those caught and corrected 
privately, a point we discuss in the next subsection. Given that we are working in the 
realm of observed frauds, we base the construction of our sample on the assumption that 
all cases of value-impacting fraud lead to a security class action lawsuit filed under the 
federal 1933 Exchange Act and or the 1934 Securities Act . If this is true, then we can 
employ the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SSCAC) data, which is the   8
most comprehensive database of such suits. This assumption seems to hold for the 
following reasons.  
First, class action law firms have automated the mechanism of filing class action 
suits so that they start searching for a cause to file a suit every time there is a negative 
shock to share prices.  Since stock prices drop following revelation of most serious 
corporate frauds, it is highly unlikely that a corporate fraud would emerge without a 
subsequent class action suit being filed (Coffee, 1986).   
Second, the class action suit will most likely be filed under the federal securities 
laws rather than State laws (Thompson and Sale, 2003).
2 The federal statute is more 
stringent than most State laws in that for federal class action is sufficient to provide 
evidence of misrepresentation (Supreme Court ruling in Green vs. Santa Fe).Thompson 
and Thomas (2003), who study state class actions suits, show that there are very few state 
cases (outside of change of control lawsuits) that lead to financial settlement, and many 
of these also involve a federal class action suit.  
The biggest potential problem with using class action data is not that we might 
miss important frauds, but rather that such an approach might be overinclusive (i.e., 
containing some allegations that are frivolous).  To address this concern we introduce six 
filters. First, we restrict our attention to alleged frauds that ended  in the period of 1996 -
2004, specifically excluding the period prior to passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) that was motivated by a desire to reduce 
frivolous suits and among other things, made discovery rights contingent on evidence. 
During 1996-2004, there are 2171 class action suits. 
                                                 
2 This trend was reinforced by the passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.   9
Second, we restrict our attention to large U.S. publicly-traded firms. Large 
domestic firms have sufficient assets and insurance to motivate law firms to initiate 
lawsuits and do not carry the complications of cross-border jurisdictional concerns. 
Operationally, we restrict our attention to firms with at least $750 million in assets in the 
year prior to the end of the class period (as firms may reduce dramatically in size 
surrounding the revelation of fraud).  The size and domestic filters reduce our sample to 
501 cases. 
  Third, we exclude all cases where the judicial review process leads to their 
dismissal.
3  Fourth, for those class actions that have settled, we only include those firms 
where the settlement is at least $3 million, a level of payment previous studies suggested 
to divide frivolous suits from meritorious ones.
4 We also explore the robustness of our 
findings to higher cutoff point for settlement: $10 million and $50 million.    
Fifth, we exclude from our analysis those security frauds that Stanford classifies 
as non standard, including mutual funds, analyst, and IPO allocation.
5  The third through 
fifth screens more than halve the number of cases from 501 to 244 cases.   
The final filter removes a handful of firms that settle for amounts of $3 million or 
greater, but where the fraud, upon our reading, seems to have settled to avoid the negative 
publicity. The rule we apply is to remove cases in which the firm’s poor ex post 
                                                 
3 We do retain cases voluntarily dismissed when the reason for dropping the suit is bankruptcy for in this 
instance the cases could still have had merit but as a result of the bankruptcy status, plaintiff lawyers no 
longer have a strong incentive to pursue them. 
4 Grundfest (1995), Choi (2004) and Choi, Nelson, and Pritchard (2005) suggest a dollar value for 
settlement as an indicator of whether a suit is frivolous or has merit. Grundfest establishes a regularity that 
suits which settle below a $2.5 -$1.5 million threshold are on average frivolous.  The range on average 
reflects the cost to the law firm for its effort in filing.  A firm settling for less than $1.5 million is most 
almost certainly just paying lawyers fees to avoid negative court exposure.  To be sure, we employ $3 
million as our cutoff.   
5 Stanford Class Action Database distinguishes these suits for the reason that all have in common that the 
host firm did not engage in wrongdoing. IPO allocation cases focus on distribution of shares by 
underwriters.  Mutual fund cases focus on timing and late trading by funds, not by the firm in question.  
Analyst cases focus on false provision of favorable coverage.   10
realization could not have been known to the firm at the time when the firm or its 
executives issued a positive outlook statement for which they are later sued.
6 This filter 
removes 14 cases producing our final sample of 230 cases. 
  While we use the term fraud, strictly speaking these are only examples of alleged 
frauds.  Settlements almost always involve no admittance of wrongdoing.  As a result, it 
is impossible for us to establish whether there was real fraud (which in legal terms 
implies the intent to deceive) or just gross negligence. For the purpose of this paper, 
however, this difference is not so relevant. We are interested in understanding the 
mechanisms that bring extreme bad forms of governance to light, not in establishing 
intent. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we do not use the adjective “alleged”.  The 
appendix relates this sample to other samples of fraud used in the literature. 
1.2 Sample Selection Biases 
By focusing on discovered frauds, we introduce two biases. First, we do not 
observe frauds that were committed but were never caught.  The intense public scrutiny 
of large U.S. firms, the ability to go back in time and sue based on past wrongdoing, and 
the strong incentives to sue by plaintiff lawyers, likely diminish this problem, but it still 
is a possibility.   
Second, we do not observe frauds caught so early that they never enter the public 
domain; hence, we cannot say anything about the importance of specific mechanisms in 
preventing fraud that does not occur.  This is a more serious limitation for considering 
                                                 
6 An illustrative example of such dropped cases is Carnival Corporation. After its stock price plunged 41% 
in a month following a period with significant fires and mechanical problems on a number of its cruise 
ships, Carnival Corporation was sued.  The fraud allegation was that the company did not comply with 
applicable safety regulations and minimized the extent of such safety problems in its public statements.  
The relatively low settlement amount ($3.4 million) combined with the fact that the company had strong 
motive to settle regardless of the merits of the case (the company’s profitability depended upon its public 
reputation), led us to drop this case.   11
fraud detection by internal control mechanisms. For example, monitoring by the board of 
directors either directly or through the audit committee might be very effective in 
deterring fraud and in stopping frauds early on. As a result of missing such early fraud 
detections, our data do not allow us to measure the effectiveness of such internal 
governance mechanisms. What our data do allow us to evaluate are which are the most 
effective external mechanisms that help detect corporate fraud when there is a failure of 
internal mechanisms.  This is a limited but important aspect of governance that has 
received little attention.    
1.3  Identifying the Detector of Fraud  
  The key variable we focus on is the identity of the actor who brings the fraud to 
light.  To do this, we manually collect information on events surrounding the fraud and 
its detection from news reports, the SSCAC database, and other public sources for each 
of our 230 cases.  Our primary source of data is Factiva, where we search the 
comprehensive database of news and wire reports over the range beginning three months 
prior to the class period and going until the settlement date or until current if the case is 
yet pending.  The only limit we apply to our search is to require that the firm’s name is in 
the first 30 words of the article. We do not restrict the media source from which the 
article might be drawn because we are concerned that local newspapers may conduct 
more thorough investigative reporting of local firms.  Thus, we sacrifice having to read 
more articles rather than miss such important fact-finding. Our searches return an 
approximate average of 800 articles per case, reflecting in part the newsworthiness of the 
alleged frauds and of the companies in question (related to their size).
7  
                                                 
7 To address potential concerns about subjectivity in identifying the first actor to bring the fraud to light, we 
used the following procedure.  To ensure consistent coding, the initial classification of the fraud detector   12
In many cases the news reporting about the fraud clearly indicates what actor 
brought this particular fraud to light, for example, a particular analyst, or employee, or 
government regulator. In other cases, the evidence is more indirect such as the 
simultaneous reporting of an auditor being fired and a discussion of difference of opinion 
regarding what come to be characterized as fraudulent reporting at the firm.  Our ability 
to access reports following the initial uncovering of the fraud and that emerged in 
additional legal and regulatory scrutiny of the cases often revealed actors behind the 
scene that forced the firm to come forward with the information (e.g. employees).  In all 
cases, we try to identify the actor that identified the concern if this lead to the fraud 
coming to light.  This means in the case of the media that we only attribute the media as 
the identifier of the fraud if the media story does not give credit for the information to 
any specific source, named or unnamed (e.g. anonymous employee).  
In a number of cases we find that the whistleblower is not the person labeled by 
the media as such.  A chain of events initiated by another entity may already be forcing 
the scandal to light when an individual expedites the process by disclosing internal 
information.  For instance, Enron’s whistleblower by our classification is the Texas 
edition of the Wall Street Journal, not Sherron Watkins who is called the Enron 
whistleblower in the media.  Of course, we do not want to discredit the importance of 
internal individuals identified as participating in bringing fraudulent activity to the public.  
However, our aim is to identify the initial force that starts the snowball of a scandal 
coming to light.  In the Enron example, investigative reporting by the Texas version of 
                                                                                                                                                 
was done by a single research assistant who was involved in all cases.  Each case was also examined by a 
minimum of one author of the paper.  Where significant judgment was required, a file was prepared of 
relevant information, all three authors read the file and agreed on the coding the outcome, often requiring 
additional searches to satisfy ourselves of the classification.     13
the Wall Street Journal raises concern about Enron’s marking-to-market practices and the 
source of firm revenues a full 8 months prior to employee whistle blowing.  
1.4   Fraud Duration  
A second variable we focus upon is the duration of the fraud.  The securities class 
action filing identifies a class period, giving a begin date and end date for the fraud.  
Because this period can and often is revised as the suit progresses, we use the most recent 
definition. The passage of SOX produced a change in the statute of limitations for filing 
cases from three years to five years.  The legal requirement may have influenced the 
reported duration of the fraud in the class action particularly prior to 2002.
8  To address 
this issue we have reclassified the maximum duration through our whole sample period to 
be three years (1,095 days).   
1.5 Other  Variables 
In the analysis that follows, we will at times reexamine the distribution of fraud 
detectors controlling for characteristics of the fraud and industry. We will describe the 
variables when introduced.  Table 1 provides definitions of all variables and sources 
  
2.   An Analysis of the Fraud Detection Process 
2.1  Who Detects Corporate Fraud? 
Table 2 presents the initial distribution of fraud detectors for the cases in our 
sample.  We begin by noting that even after reading through the large number of articles 
on companies before and after the fraud comes to light we still attribute 32% of the fraud 
                                                 
8 We examined this issue by comparing the fraud duration data and the length of financial restatements for 
all the firms in our sample with both sources of data. We find that, in part as a result of the statute of 
limitations on class actions, class periods are conservative estimates of frauds, with restatement periods on 
average being 223 days longer than class periods   14
detections to the firm itself.  We do not draw specific conclusions about the effectiveness 
of internal control systems based on this evidence alone as we do not observe those 
potential frauds also caught (and stopped) by these parties.
9  One approach that would 
allow such inferences would be to compare differences in board characteristics of firms 
in our sample and in non-fraud companies, as done  by Bowen, Call and Rajgopal (2007) 
for  firms with employee whistleblowers. This is a very valuable endeavour, but a 
different one from what we are pursuing here: the role played by external monitors.   For 
this reason, in what follows we will focus on the68% of frauds caught by external 
mechanisms.  
As Table 2 shows, the SEC accounts for 6%.  percent. Financial analysts and 
auditors do a little better (respectively 15 and 14 percent of the cases), but they hardly 
dominate the scene. Shortsellers, who should have the strongest incentive to uncover 
fraud, account for only 1 percent. Even more surprising is the key role played by actors 
who lack a governance mandate, such as the employees (19 percent), the media (15 
percent), and industry regulators (15 percent).   
2.2   Importance of Shortsellers in Fraud Detection? 
A potential concern with these results is that some actors have an incentive to 
avoid being seen as the source of the information and that we may be misattributing 
responsibility for these actors, in particular the short sellers. Shortsellers have a strong 
incentive to identify bad news and disseminate it (Diamond and Verrachia (1987)) but no 
incentive to reveal themselves as the source. A fraud-revealing short seller might be 
                                                 
9 What we can say, based on findings in Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2007), is that these revelations 
generally follow a negative operations shock (27% of these cases) or restructuring and managerial turnover 
(23% of the cases), consistent with insiders being pushed to reveal the information.  And we do not find 
that these cases are masking specific external pressures as very rarely is revelation the result of outside 
scrutiny (4% of the cases).   15
cutoff from future information from firms and might face suits or investigations for 
spreading false information (e.g. Lamont (2003)).  As a result, the fact that we only 
attribute fraud detection to short sellers in 2 cases out of  230 may be because we have 
not identified their work behind the scenes. 
  We investigate the possibility that shortsellers might be more active by 
identifying whether the level of short interest in a stock helps to predict the timing of the 
fraud coming to light, controlling for other factors.  We construct a monthly short interest 
variable with data from Bloomberg, where we normalize short interest by the number of 
the shares outstanding from CRSP to make the data comparable across companies.  Our 
goal is to answer whether short interest positions prior to fraud can predict detection 
among all possible monthly dates 1994-2004. 
  Table 3 provides evidence consistent with shortsellers predicting fraud and 
possibly having a role in its detection.  The most straightforward test is to estimate a 
logistic regression of whether fraud is detected in that period as a function of lagged short 
interest and aggregate short interest (as a percentage of market shares). The aggregate 
shares variable controls for possible changes in short activity driven by non-firm specific 
factors.  Column 1 reports that short selling is a positive and significant predictor of fraud 
detection in our sample.  
Columns 2-4 back this finding up by introducing additional controls and 
examining if short-sellers are more likely to work in combination with a particular type of 
actor. Column 2 includes additional controls for the type of fraud – whether the fraud 
involves accounting restatements and the type of fraud committed (self-dealing, 
misrepresentations on financial statements, failure to disclose, or other non-financial   16
illegal activity). Column 3 is even more stringent, replacing these controls with firm fixed 
effects. Finally, in column 4, we run separate regressions for each fraud detector type, 
again with controls that are allowed to vary by fraud type.   
These regressions indicate a symbiotic relationship between shortsellers and a 
range of actors. There is a significant association between abnormal shorting and 
detection by buyers, suppliers, and competitors (columns 2-4), media (columns 2, 4), 
analysts (column 4), and auditors (column 2). These results are consistent with other 
research that suggests shortsellers are informed as they target firms with accounting 
restatements and high accruals, anticipated downward analyst revisions, and negative 
earnings surprises (e.g. Desai et. al (2005)). 
While Table 3 indicates shortseller activity is associated with detection, it does 
not provide any indications about which specific cases should be reclassified as 
shortseller related.  To explore this possibility we conducted a related test, whereby we 
look at individual time series of short positions and ask whether the lagged short position 
could predict fraud detection for each company. Since a test for significance of a single 
point event is fraught with noise, we ask whether the 6 month average pre-detection short 
interest is greater than the mean short interest position (excluding a year and a half 
around the fraud) plus 2 standard deviations. The criterion is fairly stringent, as two 
standard deviations increase the short position 60% on average. 
In Figure 1 we plot the evolution of short interest around the date of the end of the 
class period for those with short interest greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations, 
one standard deviation, one half standard deviation and the median firm in our sample.  
The group with more than two standard deviation difference in short interest includes 16   17
cases, eight of which we reclassify as shortseller cases.  The reclassified cases were 
previously the media (4 cases), analysts (2 cases), an auditor (1 case) and a client (1 
case).  As a quality check, we re-analyzed each of these cases to search for explanations 
of the sources of the information in the fraud detection to see it there were reasons to 
eliminate a role for short sellers, and found no such cases.  We do not reclassify the 
remaining eight cases because in two of them, the employee is the fraud detector and 
there is little reason that communication went from shortseller to employee. In the other 
six cases, the timing indicates that the shortselling activity began after the detector we 
have identified brought the fraud to attention.   
2.3  Who Acts to Detect Frauds, Accounting for Indications of Shortseller Activity? 
In Table 4, we now reexamine who detects corporate fraud after having 
reclassified the additional 8 cases where there are indications of shortseller involvement.  
In all remaining tables in the paper we use this reclassified data.   
The data suggests one clear picture: no specific actor dominates the revelation of 
fraud.  The United States apparently relies upon a village of fraud detectors, many 
lacking a governance mandate. 
A second fact emerging from Table 4 is the relative unimportance of many 
mechanisms emphasized in the literature.  Completely missing are investment banks, 
commercial banks and stock exchanges.   The absence of these actors in fraud detection is 
consistent with Coffee’s (2001) hypothesis that these actors had “neither the obligation 
nor the right to make disclosure when any reasonable doubt exists concerning the client’s 
obligation of disclosure”, Coffee (2003). This result does not preclude the possibility that   18
these actors played a more indirect role: not accepting jobs from companies whenever a 
concern of fraud emerged.  
Even private security litigation, emphasized by legal scholars such as Coffee 
(1986), plays a minimal role in the revelation of fraud: less than 2 percent of the cases.  
This does not mean that private litigation is useless in preventing fraud, since it could be 
the mechanism through which people committing fraud are forced to pay for their 
mistakes.  But it does suggest that this mechanism cannot work alone.        
Similarly, the SEC accounts for only 6% of the cases, the auditors for 14%, the 
financial analysts for another 14%. Even the short-sellers are very marginal (6% of the 
cases).  More important are the media, which only recently have been considered as an 
important player in corporate governance (Zingales (2000), Dyck and Zingales (2004), 
Miller (2006), Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales, (2006)).  Even more important are players 
generally neglected by the corporate governance literature such as the employees (19%) 
and non-financial-market regulators (16%).    
2.4  How Fast Do They Act?  
The relative frequency of detection is not the only measure. Of great importance 
is also the speed of detection, i.e. how long it takes between the beginning of the fraud 
(defined as the beginning of the class action period) and detection. The faster that frauds 
are brought to light, the quicker the market can respond to this information.  Table 4 
reports these speeds of detection, expressed in months since the beginning of the fraud.  
Financial analysts and short sellers are in a league of their own, taking only a 
median duration of 9.1 months to reveal fraud. Frauds that make it through these 
monitors are then caught by auditors (14.7 months) and non-financial market regulators   19
(13.3 months).  At a similar speed, however, operates also a heterogeneous group of 
actors: external equity holders (15.9 months), and suppliers, clients and competitors of 
the firm (13.3 months).   
Finally, for frauds that persist longer, revelation of the fraud is left to actors with 
weaker access to the firm, namely, the media (21.0 months) and professional service 
firms like plaintiff lawyers (31.4 months), to employee whistleblowers (20.9 months), or 
to the SEC (21.2 months).  While this evidence on the speed of various actors could be 
influenced by characteristics of the fraud, column 6 shows that this is unlikely to be the 
case, as the rank order of median durations after accounting for various characteristics is 
practically unaltered.  
2.5  Is There Specialization by Different Fraud Detectors? 
  It is possible that certain actors specialize in detecting fraud of certain 
characteristics (type of misconduct, whether the fraud requires restatements, and whether 
the industry is regulated). If so, the frequency across all frauds may underestimate an 
actor’s role if that actor is a specialist.  
Table 5 splits the data by various criteria. Panel A breaks down frauds by four 
types of fraud introduced in Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2006):  whether the fraud 
involved self-dealing, whether the fraud involved other potentially illegal activity, and for 
the frauds that do not fit into these categories, whether the alleged fraud primarily 
focused upon financial misrepresentations (about the past or the future) or failure to 
disclose material information (about the past or the future).   
Our main results seem robust: it takes a web of monitors to detect fraud, and we 
continue to see the importance of actors who lack a governance mandate.  There are also   20
indications of limited specialization.  We, not surprisingly, find that auditors and analysts 
do better in failure-to-disclose cases. But even in this category, media and employees 
play a significant role.  Analysts (but not auditors) are also effective in misrepresentation 
cases, but employees and non financial market regulators account for almost twice as 
many detections in this category. Media, non-financial market regulators and employees 
account for the lions share of activity in policing self dealing and other illegal activity, 
while analysts are completely absent and the SEC plays no role in revealing self-dealing 
cases. 
  Panel B and Panel C explore splits on whether the fraud required financial 
restatements
10 (and hence may be a particular area of concern for auditors and financial 
market regulators) and whether the firm was in a regulated industry or not (and hence 
open to scrutiny by financial market regulators).  Again, our main results are robust, 
while revealing some degree of specialization.  In Panel B, auditors clearly specialize in 
restatement related frauds while analysts specialize in non restatement frauds.  Panel C 
shows how non financial market regulators specialize in regulated firms, a group where 
they account for almost one quarter of detections, the single greatest frequency.  Among 
non-regulated firms, short sellers are twice as frequent detectors as for regulated firms. 
Panel D examines whether the distribution of fraud detectors differs as we change 
the magnitude of the settlement amount used as a cutoff for frivolous suits.  Column 1 
reports the distribution of whistleblower for all the cases that either did not settle or 
settled for more than $3 million. Column 2 reports the distribution only for cases that 
settled for more than $3 million, while columns 3 and 4 for cases that settled for more 
                                                 
10 Many frauds require financial restatements but others do not, normally as a result of a "failure to 
disclose" material information, and/or a disclosure of misleading forward-looking information. The Data 
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than $10 and $50 million. The chi-square test in panel D reveals that the distributions are 
not significantly different suggesting little bias in focusing on the results using the 
complete sample.  Interestingly, shortsellers and the media are more important in the 
cases with the largest settlement amount while both the SEC and the auditors are less 
important. Since larger cases are generally associated with larger companies this might 
reflect the stronger influence that large firms have both on the regulators and on the 
auditors. Overall, this evidence confirms the need for a web of monitors against fraud.  
2.6  Adjusted Duration Analysis  
In Figure 2 we present yet one more approach to characterizing our findings on 
frequency and duration.  The graph plots the results of a competing risk model (a variant 
of hazard rate analysis), viewing each of our fraud detectors as competing sources for 
detecting fraud, and controlling in a regression format for the nature of the fraud and for 
whether financials were restated.  Specifically, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard 
model assuming that the likelihood of detection depends upon the fraud detector, and 
upon the same characteristics of the fraud that we used in the adjustments to median 
duration described above.  The plot indicates for each date of duration of the fraud (x 
axis) what is the probability of detection (y axis) for a given fraud detector, given a fraud 
has not yet been detected and given the characteristics of the fraud.  Thus, for example 
both at the 25
th percentile duration and at the median duration of fraud in our sample 
(indicated by dashed vertical lines), the analyst line is highest indicating that analysts are 
the most important actors for frauds of these durations.   
This figure reinforces our previous findings (based on duration data) that analysts 
are, with shortsellers, the first to act. In addition, it shows that analysts are also the most   22
frequent actors at these durations.  The fact that they are not the most dominant actors 
overall comes from the fact that they are almost entirely absent for frauds of longer than 
median duration (as it is reflected in the flat slope of the line after the median).    
Similar analyses can be done for each other actor. The relatively flat slope for the 
auditor line up to approximately 365 days indicates that it takes a year for auditors to act. 
The steep slope between 365 and 730 days indicates that auditors are active in the range 
between one and two years after the beginning of the fraud. They become inactive again 
after two years.   
The relatively constant slope of the media and non financial market regulators 
lines suggests that these detectors are involved at all durations, including short ones. The 
lower slope of the professional service and financial market regulator lines with a pickup 
later on indicates their almost exclusive relevance for frauds of longer duration.   
The employee line is particularly interesting. They are involved in detection at all 
durations, but they become more important at fraud of longer duration as indicated by the 
increasing slope of the line. The height of the line at the end indicates their absolute 
importance for frauds of the longest duration.   
2.7  Interactions Among Detectors of Fraud 
Attributing all the credit to one single whistleblower per case misses all the 
interactions between different sources of information. In the Enron case, for instance, the 
early article in the Texas edition of The Wall Street Journal attracted the interest of a 
hedge-fund manager, who began to scrutinize the company's financial statements and 
assembled a short position. The hedge-fund manager, in turn, tipped off a reporter at 
Fortune, Bethany McLean, who in March, published a story entitled "Is Enron   23
Overpriced?", where she questioned  how exactly Enron made its money. Another short-
seller tipped off Peter Eavis, of TheStreet.com, who in an article on May 9, 2001 started 
to mention shady "related entities".   Even Smith and Emshwiller (the Wall Street Journal 
reporters generally credited for the discovery of Enron’s fraud) benefited from “sources 
close to Enron <who> began to furnish the Journal with documents” (Sherman 2002).  
As this example shows, without such interactions, it may be that the initial 
suggestions of fraud may not be widely disseminated and/or believed.  Illustrating this 
potential problem is HealthSouth where the fraud would likely have been detected and 
stopped earlier if the concerns of former bookkeeper Michael Vines were heeded when 
he left the company in May 2002.  As emerged after the fact in response to Congressional 
concerns about how this fraud could have gone detected for so long, Vines reportedly 
sent his concerns to Ernst and Young, but was ignored, and then in early 2003 posted his 
concerns on Yahoo web site, where he wrote: "I know for a fact that HRC has assets on 
the books that are made up to trick the auditors." This information channel lacked 
credibility, as suggested in the comments of an online naysayer: "If you really had 
information, you would have shorted the stock and given your info to the appropriate 
people. You wouldn't be babbling about it here.”
11  
Table 6 provides indications of some of these interactions.  This table reports “to 
whom” the whistle was blown, identifying the next actor after the fraud detector involved 
in bringing the fraud to light.  For shortsellers and analysts, for example, the media is 
clearly a complementary actor being the “to whom” actor in 60% and 57% of cases 
respectively. Analysts also enjoy their own credibility, being the “to whom” actor for 
                                                 
11 By Carrick Mollenkamp, Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2003," Missed Signal: Accountant Tried In Vain 
to Expose HealthSouth Fraud --- Ex-Employee Took His Case To Auditors, Then Web -- But Convinced 
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20% of the shortseller cases. At the same time, in 38% of the cases the analysts are the 
end of the line, and blow the whistle directly to the “public”.   
Employees rely upon a wider range of additional actors including non-financial 
regulators (33%), lawyers (13%), the SEC (10%), the media (3%), and other external 
(3%).  In 37% of these cases, employees whistle blowing is followed up by the firm 
revealing the information.  The overall takeaway is that looking at interactions reinforces 
our earlier findings of the importance of a range of actors, and particularly reinforces the 
relevance of the media and non-financial regulators who account for 23% and 10% of 
cases in the “to whom” channel respectively.  
2.8  Where Do the Fraud Detectors Get Their Information? 
  Finally, we ask what were the primary sources of information used by each fraud 
detector in identifying the fraud.  For each fraud, we read the case and identified the 
likely source of the information by the detector.  We contrast information that arises from 
SEC mandated disclosures and information derived from all other sources. Among other 
information sources we distinguish information that could be constructed from public 
sources (e.g. comparing a firm relative to competitors); information that emerges from 
non-financial market regulator requirements; and information internal to the firm.   
Table 7 presents these results. Except for the employees, the auditors, and the non 
financial market regulators, all the actors rely heavily on SEC disclosure. Thus, financial 
disclosure is crucial for fraud detection (39% of the cases), but insufficient. To identify 
fraud it is often necessary to have access to information inside the firm (37% of the 
cases). In only a third of these cases do the auditors reveal the fraud, in almost half, the 
employees.  The other major source of information is regulatory discovery (15% of the   25
cases). Only 8% of the frauds are identified thanks to private collection of information. 
One third of these investigations are done by analysts.  
Given the variety of information sources, these results confirm the need for a web 
of monitors to detect fraud. They also highlight the costs associated to collecting the 
information to reveal a fraud. Only 24% of the fraud detection is the result of information 
collected in a specific investigation. The vast majority seems serendipitous discoveries by 
people who had access to the crucial information in the normal course of their business. 
The crucial question, then, is what are the incentives for these people to reveal the fraud? 
We will attempt to answer this question in the next section.  
 
3.  What Are the Incentives to Blow the Whistle?   
Some actors– like auditors and financial market regulators — have a clear 
mandate to bring fraud to light. But what motivates the others?  We focus our discussion 
on those groups where we have a relatively large number of observations - financial 
analysts, the media, and employees - and on plaintiff law attorneys, an actor prominent in 
discussions of the importance of private enforcement.   To organize our analysis of each 
of these actors we will focus on four factors that, as theory suggests, should be crucial: 
the access to information at low cost, the incentives to collect additional information, the 
monetary or career benefit from whistle blowing and the costs whistle blowers can face.  
Before doing so, we note that the fraud detectors we observe are those who had the 
highest incentives to do so and hence our estimate of the cost-benefit ratio is downward 
biased.  This makes the findings that we detail below, that  their monetary and career   26
incentives to blow the whistle are in almost all circumstances very low, particularly 
remarkable.  
3.1 Financial  Analysts 
We identify a fraud detector as a financial analyst if they work in a brokerage 
house or investment bank or if they work for investors directly, issuing newsletters or 
public statements about companies.   
From an information point of view, analysts are well located. While they do not 
have direct access to company information, especially after regulation FD (adopted by 
the SEC in August of 2000) curtailed their privileged access to companies’ management, 
they are in the business of collecting information for valuation purposes. So while their 
goal is not to search for fraud, they might be particularly well positioned to identify it, by 
comparing results across companies in the same industry.  Table 7 provides some useful 
indications of the relative importance of information from these channels, with this 
collectible public information accounting for 19% of cases and information internal to the 
firm accounting for 14% of cases. 
Viewed as agents of professional investors, analysts appear to have strong 
incentives to reveal fraud.  Each analyst is paid to analyze companies and has potentially 
improved career prospects for establishing a reputation of insightful analysis valuable to 
investors. Identifying frauds is one part of establishing such a reputation (e.g. Fama 
(1980), Hong and Kubik (2000)).
12 Analysts’ incentives to reveal fraud, however, may be 
reduced by the potential conflict of interest between the advising they do and the 
investment banking services their company generally offer (e.g. Michaely and Womak 
                                                 
12 Consistent with such career concerns in the analyst industry, Hong and Kubik (2000), for example, report 
that good forecast records are rewarded by upward mobility to higher-tiered brokerage houses, and the 
maintenance of jobs in top-tier brokerage houses.   27
(1999)). Their incentives to reveal fraud may also be significantly reduced or eliminated 
by their tendency to herd.
13  Finally, before regulation FD analysts might have had 
incentives to develop a good reputation vis-à-vis the companies they followed to gain 
privileged access to soft information. If this were the case, they might not have the right 
incentives to bring a fraud to light.     
  Our findings lend support to both views.  The fact that analysts are the first line of 
defense in terms of the speed at which they detect fraud suggests their capabilities to 
detect frauds. But the fact that analysts only account for 15 percent of our observations 
suggest that this channel has not been fully exploited.   
To further our understanding of financial analyst incentives in our sample, we 
gathered information on the identity of the analyst that brought the information to light, 
including the investment bank they worked for. To explore the potential impact on their 
career, we investigated the three year window surrounding the revelation of fraud. Since 
we do not have access to their bonus information, our only proxy for their career prospect 
is the Institutional Investor All American Analyst ranking.  The magazine gives 
individuals this designation based upon a survey they conduct each year of buy-side 
money managers.  As Hong and Kubik (2000) report, “All Stars” are actively sought by 
investment banks and receive the highest salaries.   
Consistent with Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), we find in Table 8 that 
analysts’ willingness to go against the herd (as signified by their identifying fraud) 
increases with age and with the status of their brokerage house: 59 percent of financial 
                                                 
13 Sharfstein and Stein (1990) for example identify a “share the blame” effect whereby costs are greater in 
being different and incorrect, than in being incorrect like everyone else.  This herding based bias is greater 
when analysts are young and there is uncertainty about their ability.   28
analyst detections are associated with analysts in top 10 investment banks, 14 percent in 
brokerage houses ranking 11
th - 40
th, and 27 percent in other institutions.   
But we do not find any evidence associated with a significant reward for detecting 
fraud.  No financial analyst changed into a different investment bank tier in the two years 
following their revelation of fraud. And there was only a small change in likelihood of 
being an All Star.  Prior to detection, 24 percent of the analysts detecting fraud belonged 
to the All Stars group. Following the revelation of fraud, the probability of entering the 
elite group is only an additional 6 percent. Unfortunately, we do not have a good measure 
of the counterfactual (what this probability would have been had they not identified the 
fraud), but even if the alternative would have been zero, a 6 percentage point increase 
does not seem a very high reward.   
3.2 Media 
Journalists are similar to analysts, in the sense that they collect and analyze 
information for their clients (the readers). They also have an incentive to build a 
reputation of being nice vis-à-vis companies in order to cultivate their sources (Dyck and 
Zingales (2003)). And as with analysts, there may also be a conflict arising from the fact 
that the companies in their stories often make direct payments to their employers (e.g. 
advertising).  
The main difference between journalists and analysts is that journalists are much 
less specialized than analysts and thus potentially have access to less company and 
industry specific information. On the upside, however, journalists might benefit more 
from revelation of fraud, because a scoop may help establish their career and reputation.    29
The data in Table 7 show that for cases where media are the whistle blowers, they rely 
most heavily on mandated disclosure, accounting for 71% of cases. 
Our data seem to suggest that the incentives to reveal fraud differ tremendously 
between major national outlets and minor ones. As Table 9 shows, 11 of the 13 cases 
reported by newspapers are published in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times. 
Similarly, Business Week and Fortune account for 5 of the 6 cases identified by 
magazines. Why do minor and local newspapers play no role?  
One possibility is that minor newspapers cannot afford the most talented 
journalists able to do the investigation necessary to discover fraud, cannot afford to pay 
for the cost of these investigations, or focus such activity on smaller more local 
companies.
14 An alternative hypothesis is that only very established media with a 
diversified advertising base can afford to alienate potential (or actual) advertisers. The 
pressure faced by Fortune when it was about to publish the first negative report on Enron 
gives credibility to the second hypothesis.
15     
That most newspapers are not willing to pay and publish scoops on corporate 
fraud might also reflect the fact that these types of news are less entertaining (Miller 
(2006), Dyck, Moss, and Zingales (2005)). After all, the National Enquirer pays a fortune 
to find out every possible detail about the personal lives of media stars.      
                                                 
14 In Miller’s (2006) study of firms with SEC Accounting, Auditing and Enforcement Releases which 
includes many smaller companies, he finds that local news outlets report frauds in 30.7 percent of cases 
flagged by the press prior to revelation by the firm. 
15 As reported in the New York Times, “Her questions were so pointed that Enron's chief executive, Jeffrey 
K. Skilling, called her unethical for failing to do more research. Three Enron executives flew to New York 
in an unsuccessful effort to convince her editors that she was wrongheaded. Enron's chairman, Kenneth L. 
Lay, called Fortune's managing editor, Rik Kirkland, to complain that Fortune was relying on a source who 
stood to profit if the share price fell.” Felicity Barringer, “10 Months Ago, Questions on Enron Came and 
Went With Little Notice,” 28 January 2002, Page 11, Column 1. 
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Table 9 also tries to get at the personal career incentives of the journalists. While 
many of the journalists involved are national figures who also write books, it is not clear 
that they became national figures by exposing fraud. The upside from revealing 
information seems limited. On the positive side, however, the downside seems limited as 
well. While there are many stories insinuating that analysts got fired for their negative 
report on companies, we are not aware of any claim that journalists get fired for this 
reason. Hence, journalists might be better protected than analysts on the downside 
associated with whistle blowing. 
3.3 Employees 
 In no case is the tension between access to information and lack of incentives to 
reveal fraud more intense than for employees. Employees clearly have access to 
information; few, if any, frauds can be committed without involving some interaction 
among the people within a firm. However, the career incentives against revealing the 
fraud are stronger for employees than for any other group. Even according to an advocate 
for whistleblowing, consequences to being the whistleblower include distancing and 
retaliation from fellow workers and friends, personal attacks on one’s character during 
the course of a protracted dispute, and the need to change one’s career.
16  
To elucidate under what context an employee whistleblower would act, we 
construct Table 10, a summary of the whistleblower position and incentives for each of 
the 30 cases for employee whistleblowers.  As expected, the burdens of whistleblowing 
are large. In 82% of cases where the identity of the whistleblower was revealed, s/he was 
fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities.  In addition, many 
employee whistleblowers report having to move to another industry and toanother town.  
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Referring to James Bingham, a whistleblower in the Xerox case, his lawyer said: "Jim 
had a great career, but he'll never get a job in Corporate America again."  
The surprising part, thus, is not that most employees do not talk; it is that some 
talk at all. Table 10 tries to give a sense of what motivates them. In 45 % of the cases, the 
costs of blowing the whistle are eliminated by keeping the identity of the whistleblower 
concealed.
17  This is often the case when the company is unionized. The unions seem to 
be in a good position to protect the whistleblowing employee from the potential 
retaliation. 
In 35 percent of the cases (6 out of 17) where the identity of the whistleblowers is 
known, we observe a qui tam lawsuit.  Such suits arise from the Federal Civil False 
Claims Act, revised in 1986, whereby individuals revealing fraud committed against the 
U.S. government can collect 15 – 30% of the money recovered by the government. In our 
sample, two qui tam cases that have already settled rendered whistleblowers with rewards 
of $35million and $70 million.  More generally, the outcome of qui tam suits is very 
uncertain and very delayed in time (5 and 10 years in these cases), but the expectation is 
that these rewards might have been an important factor in leading the employee to talk.  
In addition to the monetary reward in the form of qui tam payments, the 
revelation of information seems to be associated to a wrongful dismissal claim in another 
30% of the cases (5 out of 17). These are cases in which the employee has already been 
fired, and so s/he has less to lose. In the remaining 35% of the cases, however, it is 
                                                 
17 This includes 9 cases where the individual is anonymous, 3 cases where there multiple individuals all 
associated with an employee organization blowing the whistle, and 2 cases where a change of authority 
from one to another accounting group (e.g. arising from a merger) brought out the information and the 
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difficult to find a rational reason for the employee to talk, especially in light of the very 
high emotional costs paid by whistleblowers. 
3.4  Plaintiff Law Firms 
In the corporate governance literature private enforcement plays a prominent role 
among the set of mechanisms to protect shareholders (e.g., La Porta et al., 2003). In our 
sample we find only two cases (equal to 1.4 percent) where a security class action is the 
mechanism that triggers the revelation of fraud. In both cases, the class action suit leads 
to the discovery of information about managerial self dealing. For example, in the case of 
Sprint, the plaintiff sues the company for the failed merger with WorldCom and this leads 
to the discovery of a bylaw, introduced by management just before the attempted merger, 
ensuing them a payoff regardless of the outcome of the merger.   
  That class action plays almost no role in the revelation of fraud does not mean it is 
not an important mechanism to prevent fraud. First of all, it could play an important role 
in punishing who has committed fraud. Second, it could help publicize and make credible 
the claims made by other whistle blowers. At the very minimum, however, our finding 
suggests that private litigation alone is not sufficient to stop fraud. It can only work when 
a web of other mechanisms help bring fraud to light.    
3.5   How Much Do Incentives Matter? 
  As a test of the effect of incentives on whistle-blowing, we exploit the fact that 
qui tam lawsuits are not available in all industries, but only in very few industries where 
the government is a significant buyer of services.  Specifically, in Table 11 we compare 
the distribution of whistleblowers between the healthcare industry, which is a significant 
buyer of government services, and all other industries. Consistent with this incentive   33
having a significant impact, we find a striking difference, with employees accounting for 
46.7% of cases of fraud detection cases in the healthcare industry vs. 16.3% in industries 
where employees cannot easily avail themselves of the rewards from qui tam lawsuits. 
Since a Chi-Square test rejects the hypothesis that the distributions are equivalent, we can 
conclude that these types of incentives matter.
18  
A potential objection against stronger incentives to whistle blowing is that these 
incentives might create a free option for the employees, leading to an excessive amount 
of false claims.
19 To test this proposition we look at the frequency of frivolous suits (suits 
dismissed or settled for less than 3 million) in the healthcare industry (where these 
incentives are present) and in the other industries (where they are not clearly present). We 
find that the percentage of frivolous suits (panel B) is lower in the healthcare industry. 
Hence, there is no evidence that stronger incentives to blow the whistle lead to more 
frivolous suits.  
 
4. Did the Situation Change After the Major Scandals?   
Thus far we have considered the whole period 1996 to 2004 as homogenous. But 
after the turn of the millenium many things have changed. First, in 2000 regulation Fair 
Disclosure was approved, making it impossible for analysts to have private conversations 
with top executives of the firms they follow. According to the proponents of this 
measure, this change should have increased analysts’ independence, making them more 
                                                 
18 This also provides a rationale for Bowen, Call and Rajgopal’s (2007) finding that employee 
whistleblowing were more likely in firms in ‘sensitive’ industries, which they defined as including 
pharmaceuticals, healthcare, medicine, the environment, oil, utilities and banksl . 
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likely to reveal fraud.  According to the opponents, this change could reduce analysts’ 
incentives to search for information, making them less likely to reveal fraud.   
In late 2001 and early 2002 the Enron Scandal and the collapse of Arthur 
Andersen increased the risk faced by auditors and thus their incentives to speak up.  
In July 2002 the Sarbanes Oxely act was passed, introducing a vast array of 
changes.  SOX made SEC involvement more politically appealing by providing that SEC 
civil penalties be used to compensate investors that were victims of securities fraud. It 
also made SEC involvement more feasible by significantly increasing its budget.  SOX 
also dramatically changed auditors incentives by introducing a ban on consulting work 
done by audit firms, by making it clearer that their primary responsibility was to the 
board, and through section 404 requiring enhanced internal controls and investigation of 
control weaknesses by auditors.  
SOX also altered the cost of whistleblowing for the employees.  Section 301 
requires audit committees of publicly traded companies to establish procedures for “the 
confidential anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding 
questionable accounting or auditing matters.”  It also enhances protections for employees 
against being fired for coming forward with such information.   
Finally, in April 2003 the New York Attorney General reached a settlement with 
ten of the nation's top investment firms aimed at promoting the independence of equity 
research. If this Global Research Settlement achieved its goal, the analysts should have 
become more independent and thus active in revealing fraud.  
Since all of these changes took place almost simultaneously, it is impossible to 
separate the effect of each one of them. It is possible, however, to see whether the relative   35
frequency of the different type of whistleblowers changed according to the net changes in 
their relative incentives.  
Table 12 examines changes in the activity of auditors before and after Enron.  It 
reveals a significant uptick in the overall level of auditor involvement in detection and in 
the scope of their detection activity.  Prior to Enron, auditors accounted for just 9.6% of 
frauds detected by external actors, and focused exclusively on frauds requiring financial 
restatements.  Post Enron, they account for 16.9% of cases, and their activity is spread 
across not only financial restatement cases, but also those cases not involving 
restatements.  One possible explanation for this broader scope is auditors’ increased 
exposure to liability for a firm’s fraudulent activity.  Another is that auditors become 
more aware of fraudulent activity as a result of their responsibility in evaluating internal 
controls per SOX section 404.  
In Table 13 we examine time trends more comprehensively, looking at changes 
pre and post SOX for the overall distribution of fraud detectors.  The table shows a 
stunning increase in the role of auditors (a four fold increase in the relative frequency of 
detections) and of the SEC (a doubling of their importance, albeit from a very low level). 
The increased role of the auditors come at the expense of analysts (who drop from 14 to 
11% of the cases of detection), of shortellers (from 9 to 0%), and the media (from 15 to 
9%).  
That the percentage of employee whistleblowers (Table 13) drops from 21 to 16% 
suggests Sox’s modest incentives for whistleblowers have not been very effective. One 
possible explanation is that protecting the whistleblower current job is a small reward 
given the extensive ostracism whistleblowers face. Another explanation could be that    36
many firms either go bankrupt or are bought up after revelation of fraud. As a result, job 
protection in the pre-existing firm is but a small reward. 
 
5.  The Paradox of Whistle Blowing    
  Generalizing from our results, we arrive at what might be called a paradox of 
whistle blowing: those with weakest incentives to blow the whistle (e.g. employees) are 
most active, while those with the strongest incentives to act (e.g. shortsellers) act very 
rarely. This paradox can be understood in the context of Hayek’s (1945) idea that 
information is diffuse.  The whistleblowers with weak incentives have superior access to 
information about the frauds and this access to information eventually leads to its use 
despite the weak incentives.  Those with incentives, by contrast, have difficulty accessing 
credible information to act upon.  
  This Hayekian view suggests a distinction between two approaches to fraud 
detection. The first, which we might label the “mandated” approach, consists of 
entrusting some individuals with the task of collecting information that might lead to the 
detection of fraud. These individuals are generally paid for the effort they exert, not for 
the outcome they achieve. These actors include external auditors, financial market 
regulators, industry regulators, and other non-financial market government offices. 
  The alternative approach, which we might label the “market” approach, does not 
designate ex ante the people in charge of detecting fraud. By contrast, it provides a 
reward system for people who bring fraud to light. These incentives can be monetary, as 
in the case of shortsellers, reputational, as in the case of financial analysts exposing 
problems in their reports, or moral, as is alleged with some employee whistle blowing.    37
  In comparing the functioning of these two systems, which coexist as in the U.S. 
market, it is useful to focus on two dimensions: the cost to collect the information 
necessary to identify fraud and the incentives not only to collect this information, but also 
to reveal it. At one extreme, we have shortsellers, who can benefit handsomely from the 
revelation of bad news, but have the most limited access to company-specific information 
and thus are likely to have the highest cost to collect it. On the other hand, we have 
employees. They have the lowest cost of collecting information: they stumble on frauds 
in the regular course of their jobs. But they generally derive no benefit from revealing 
bad information. In fact, they often pay a significant cost in doing so in terms of loss of 
employment, ostracism, verbal and sometimes even physical harassment. Between these 
two extremes lay all the other actors.  
  The two approaches differ in the way they use incentives and in the way they tap 
into the diffuse information already present in the system. With diffuse information, the 
market works best when incentives are provided where the information is.  The mandated 
system, in contrast, designates those with responsibility and requires that information be 
provided  where the incentives are (or at least where there are no strong disincentives).   
  As Table 4 makes it clear, the market approach dominates fraud detection during 
this period. The mandated approach accounts for just 20% of detections if we restrict our 
focus to auditors (14%) and the financial market regulators (6%).  If we adopt a more 
encompassing view of mandated mechanisms and also count non-financial-market 
regulators, this total only increases to 36% of our sample.  In contrast, all market based 
actors collectively account for 64% of cases.      38
It is possible that mandated actors could, in part, make up for their relative 
infrequency of action by being much quicker to act, which would improve affairs as 
efficiency is clearly enhanced if information about the frauds was brought to the attention 
of the public earlier.  But we find that this is not the case.  As shown in column 5, the 
median duration of frauds caught by market actors is 15 months, marginally faster than 
frauds caught by mandated actors as a whole (15.8 months) and definitely faster than 
frauds caught by financial market mandated actors (16.8 months). 
This dominance of market-based actors was much more extreme pre 2002, when 
market-based actors accounted for 73% of the cases detected. After 2002, mandated 
actors were more active with a 56% to 44% lead. This change is mainly due to a surge in 
the activity of auditors. One explanation for these results is that the mandate was poorly 
designed prior to 2002 and these mandates have been strengthened.   External auditors 
historically have been tasked with attesting that the financial information provided by 
firm management is prepared consistent with generally accepted accounting principles 
and while required to report fraud that they see, they have not had an obligation to seek 
out fraud.
20  The nature of this mandate has changed only recently. In 1997 a Statement 
of Auditing Standard clarified that auditors had a responsibility to detect material 
misstatements. More importantly, the passage of SOX  increased the obligation of 
auditors in this domain. .  
                                                 
20 This distinction can be traced as far back as the Kingston Cotton Mills Case of 1896, which concluded 
that auditors were not responsible for uncovering frauds "It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the 
work he has to perform that skill, care, and caution which a reasonably competent, careful, and cautious 
auditor would use.  An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or, as was said, to approach his work with 
suspicion, or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a 
bloodhound.  Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of 
fraud, when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion ...So to hold would make the position of an auditor 
intolerable." Lord Lopes, 1896, cited in Sarup (2004).    39
Similarly, while the SEC has responsibility in policing against fraud, it has 
suffered from a paucity of resources, particularly during the late 1990s and has since then 
seen an increase in its budget.
21  
What this study cannot determine is which aspect of the post 2002 reforms has 
triggered a change in auditors’ behavior. Is it the severing of the consulting business with 
their clients, the effect of the demise of Arthur Andersen, the effect of required increased 
professional skepticism by auditors, or the increased awareness of frauds arising from 
implementation of section 404 and internal controls? In other words, is this a permanent 
change or a temporary reaction to an event that made the risk of bad auditing salient, 
reaction that will subside with time?  Only time will tell.  
  What our study can determine, however, are the effects of the other reforms. And 
overall, they seem to be ineffective. Analysts do not seem to be more active as a result of 
regulation FD and the global research settlement. Similarly,  employees do not appear to 
feel protected by the provisions in section 301 of SOX.  
  What our study can also suggest is a different approach to reforms. As the 
evidence in the healthcare industry shows, employees respond to incentives and a reward 
to whistle-blowing leads to a higher rate of detection. This higher rate of detection does 
not appear to come at the cost of more frivolous suits.  
The idea of extending the qui tam statue to corporate frauds (i.e. providing a 
financial award to those who bring forward information about a corporate fraud) is very 
                                                 
21 As the GAO (2002b) reports, “The percent of all corporate filings that received a full review, a full 
financial review, or were just monitored for specific disclosure items decreased from about 21 percent in 
1991 when 13,198 were reviewed to about 8 percent in 2000 when 8,498 were reviewed”  Further analysis 
is provided in Mark Maremont and Deborah Solomon, “Missed Chances: Behind SEC's Failings: Caution, 
Tight Budget, '90s Exuberance --- Its Reactive Culture Made Agency Slow Off the Mark While Spitzer 
Raced Ahead --- Giving Up Too Soon on Tyco,”Wall Street Journal, 24 December 2003. 
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much in the Hayekian spirit of sharpening the incentives of those who are endowed with 
information.  This proposal has an additional benefit. If it does not work and no 
whistleblower provides useful information, no money will be spent for the reward. In this 
regard, it is a much more cost-effective than usual forms of regulation, where the cost is 
borne even if the regulation has no positive effect. And if the reward system works very 
well and is very effective in deterring corporate fraud, very little money will be paid in 
rewards because very little fraud will be committed. Once again, this is different from a 
mandated approach, where the costs have to be paid even when the deterrence effect 
makes frauds extremely unlikely.    
      
6. Conclusions  
The clearest result emerging from our data is that in the United States fraud 
detection relies on a wide range of, often improbable, actors. No single one of them 
accounts for more than 20% of the cases detected. These findings suggest that the failures 
of internal governance in other countries cannot be easily solved by introducing U.S. 
institutions like class action suits or the SEC (together they account for only 8.4% of the 
revelation of frauds by external actors). An effective corporate governance system relies 
on a complex web of market actors that complement each other. Unfortunately, 
reproducing such a complex system abroad is much more difficult than copying a single 
legal institution. 
The other clear result is that, at least before SOX, the “mandated” approach to 
fraud detection did not work well at all. Only 5.8% of the fraud cases were identified by 
the authority in charge of discovering them (i.e., the SEC). Even if we enlarge the 
definition and we include external auditors (who have a duty to disclose fraud when they   41
find it, but not to search for it) and industry regulators (who are not in charge to look for 
financial frauds), only 35.3% of the cases were revealed by people appointed to search 
for it.  
  One interpretation of these results is that information about fraud is so diffuse that 
is extremely costly (and so ineffective) to appoint an official investigator: it is like 
looking for a needle in the proverbial haystack. Fraud tends to be revealed by people who 
find out about it in their normal course of business and who do not have any strong 
disincentive (or even better have some positive incentive) to reveal it. For example, in 
sectors like healthcare where qui tam suits are possible and thus whistleblowers are 
rewarded, employees play a much bigger role in revealing fraud.  
  Unfortunately, we have shown that in many real world situations (like auditors, 
analysts, and employees in other sectors) there are little or no monetary or career-related 
incentives to reveal fraud. That only the most established newspapers and the most senior 
analysts are willing to come forward suggests – to the contrary- that the risks involved in 
blowing the whistle are substantial.  
  After the introduction of SOX, which significantly increased their duties and 
monitoring, the performance of mandated actors improved. Still they account for only 
slightly more than 50% of the cases. Only time will tell whether this recent surge in their 
relative performance is just a temporary blip, due to the enormous amount of public 
scrutiny that certain actors (like auditors) received after a few major corporate scandals, 
or a permanent shift due to the changes in the incentives imposed by legislation.      42
Either way our analysis suggests an alternative, cheap, way to address the 
problem: to extend the qui tam legislation to corporate fraud. As the evidence in the 
healthcare industry shows, such a system seems to work very effectively.  
  An objection to this approach is that it might lead to an excessive amount of 
frivolous suits. But the evidence in the healthcare industry seems to dismiss this concern. 
Another objection is that an explicit reward to whistleblowers might foster distrust among 
employees, undermining their ability to work together for the benefit of the company. We 
are not aware of any sign of this problem in sectors subject to qui tam suits, but this is 
certainly an aspect that deserves further study before this idea is implemented.    43
Data Appendix 
Comparing Our Sample with Other Fraud Samples  
Many accounting studies focus on a sample of companies identified by the GAO 
that restated their financial statements between 1997 and June 2002 (e.g. Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004)).  This ‘GAO sample’ includes all type of restatements (i.e. major and 
minor, revenue increasing and decreasing, and as a result of new GAAP, reclassification 
of accounts, merger/acquisition, restructuring charges or fraud).   
 
Our sample differs in two principle ways.  First, many of these cases will not 
make it into our sample.  This arises because the GAO sample includes: some non-US 
firms; the GAO sample includes many smaller firms that do not meet the selection 
criteria for our sample (the median market cap in the GAO sample (measured at date t-1) 
is $ 214 million while the market cap of firms in our sample (also measured at t-1) is $ 
3525 million); and, because the underlying fraud is not sufficiently serious to trigger a 
lawsuit that withstands scrutiny and yields a settlement or is ongoing .   Second, this 
approach does not allow for cases of fraud where firms do not issue restatements, a 
category of frauds that accounts for 38 percent of our observations.   
 
Other accounting studies have focused on a narrower sample of firms where the 
SEC has sanctioned the firm and released an Accounting, Auditing and Enforcement 
Release (AAER) (e.g. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), Miller (2006)).  We will 
capture these cases if there is a simultaneous suit under federal securities laws that meets 
our tests for inclusion.  The SEC sample also is focused on smaller firms (the median 
market cap (measured at t-1) for AAER firms is 262 million) and, given its limited 
budget, on a few high profile and egregious cases of fraud.
22  Our companion paper 
provides a more complete comparison of these samples and the relationship of our 
sample to these. 
 
The larger size of firms in our sample likely corresponds with additional scrutiny 
both before the fraud was brought to light and evaluation of the fraud and how it got 
uncovered after the fact.  This additional scrutiny aids us in identifying the likely source 
of the information about fraud and in identifying some of the interactions among fraud 
detectors, including identifying actors who pushed the board to action.  These factors 
help to account for the higher percentage of cases in our sample where indications of 
fraud arise from actors outside the firm.  In our sample, we identify the firm as the source 
of information in 32% of cases whereas the firm is identified as the source in between 
49% and 58% of cases in the GAO sample (1997-2002, and 2002-2005 respectively), and 
in 71% of cases in the AAER sample used by Miller (2006).
23  
 
                                                 
22 Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) write:  “because our sample is subject to SEC enforcement actions, 
it is almost certainly biased toward the inclusion of the more obvious and spectacular cases of earnings 
manipulation.”  
23 Correspondence with Shiva Rajgopal, January 2007.   44
Legal scholars have been the biggest user of the SSCAC database to construct 
samples of probable frauds (see citations above).  A potential concern with this sample is 
that it is potentially missing additional cases of alleged fraud that are filed as a class 
action under state laws or as a derivative action. Thompson and Sale (2003) and 
Thompson and Thomas (2003, 2004) provide analysis and evidence that exploring such 
suits would not turn up many additional cases as there has been a profound shift in cases 
from state to federal courts, accentuated by the passage of PSLRA and the Uniform 
Standards Act (1998). Their comprehensive analysis of these filings in Delaware in 1999 
and 2000 shows that almost all such cases that withstand scrutiny are breach of fiduciary 
duties in merger and acquisitions (and thus not fraud in the general use of this term in that 
they do not involve misrepresentations). 
 
Identifying Frauds that Require Restatements 
 
We distinguish between frauds that required financial restatements and frauds that 
do not.  To identify whether the fraud involved restatements we used information from 
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report on Financial Statement 
Restatements that identifies 918 restatement announcements from 1997 to June 2002, 
which we matched to those in our sample.  We also searched a firm’s SEC filings after 
the revelation of fraud for either (a) a 10-Q/A or 10-K/A filing which indicate amended 
filings; or (b) an 8-K which referred to restatement information.  We identified a fraud as 
involving misrepresentation if any of the following conditions applied:  it restated its 
financials [116 cases]; it announced an intention to restate its financials but did not as a 
result of bankruptcy (e.g. Enron) [7 cases]; it took a one-time accounting-related charge 
[6 cases]; and, it is an ongoing case where there are accounting-related investigations [3 
cases].   
 
The residual category of frauds that don’t require financial misrepresentation, are 
primarily composed of "failure to disclose" material information, and a disclosure of 
misleading forward-looking information, with the case of CVS illustrating the first type 
and Ascend the second type.  In the case of CVS, the alleged fraud was to issue positive 
statements concerning its business and operations and possibilities for expansion but not 
to disclose  that a national shortage of pharmacists was negatively impacting CVS's 
business forcing a scale back in expansion plans.  Or consider the case of Ascend 
Communications, where the company followed a competitor’s announcement that it 
would ship a 56K modem, with a near immediate announcement that it too would ship a 
56K modem and beat the competitor to market, even though there were strong 
indications, including the supplier that allegedly would produce the modem, that 
suggested this was not possible. 
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Figure 1 – Short Interest and the Timing of Fraud Detection 
 
This figure illustrates the pattern of short interest around the timing of fraud detection in our sample.   Short 
interest is defined as the total number of shares investors have sold short but have not yet bought back.  divided by 
the total number of outstanding shares for each company. The standard deviation bands are defined based on 
the 6 month average pre-detection short interest relative to the mean short interest position for that firm 
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Figure 2 - Hazard of Being Detected by Fraud Detector 
 
This figure is based on a Cox proportional hazard model of the likelihood of detection.  For each duration 
the figure plots the probability of detection by each fraud detector (i.e. 1- survival probability), after 
controlling for the type of fraud.  A higher line at a specific duration indicates that type of fraud detector is 
more likely to have detected the fraud up until that point.   
 
  
Table 1 – Data Definition and Sources 
This table identifies the main variables used in our analysis, defines the variables, and provides the sources.  
 
Variable Description  Sources 
Detector of 
Fraud 
The actor who first identifies the fraud based on a combined reading of the legal case documents and an average of 800 
articles from Factiva in a window from 3 months before the class action period to settlement.   Ten detector categories 
include: external auditor, financial analyst, investor, shortseller,  media, strategic players, financial market regulators, 
non-financial market regulators, employees and professional service organizations. The detection is attributed to the 
media only when the story does not indicate another actor as the principal source of information. Strategic players 
include suppliers, clients and competitors. Financial market regulators are the SEC and stock exchanges. Non-financial 
market regulators include industry regulators (e.g. FERC, FAA, FDA)  and other government agencies. Professional 
service firms are law and insurance firms. 
Security Class actions filings 
available from Stanford Securities 
Class Action Database, Articles in 
Factiva. 
Fraud Duration 
The class period defined in the security class action, reflecting all adjustments made before settlement.  We restrict the 
maximum duration to 3 years, to avoid changes in duration possibly arising from changing rules with the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley in July of 2002. 





Observation has value 1 if: the firm filed a 10-Q/A or 10-K/A filing or an 8-K which referred to restatement information 
[116 cases]; it announced an intention to restate its financials but did not as a result of bankruptcy (e.g. Enron) [7 cases]; 
it took a one-time accounting-related charge [6 cases]; and, it is an ongoing case where there are accounting-related 
investigations [3 cases]. 
SEC filings, General Accounting 




Firm in following categories:   financials (SIC 6000-6999), transportation equipment (SIC 3700-3799), transportation, 
communications, electric, gas and sanitary services (SIC 4000-4999), drug, drug proprietaries and druggists sundries 
(SIC 5122), petroleum and petroleum products wholesalers (SIC 5172), pharmaceuticals (SIC 2830-2836), and 
healthcare providers (8000-8099), and healthcare related firms in Business Services. 
Industries identified in Winston 
(1998) and others. 
Nature of Fraud 
Controls 
Dummy variables identify primary nature of fraud as either self-dealing, non-accounting related illegal activity (e.g. 
price fixing and non-compliance), financial misrepresentations, and failure to disclose. 
Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2006) 
based on Factiva and Security Class 
actions filings. 
Short Interest  The total number of shares investors have sold short but have not yet bought back.  This information is available 
monthly from Bloomberg. We normalize short interest by the total number of outstanding shares for each company.  Bloomberg 
Aggregate Short 
Interest 
The aggregate short position in the markets (NASDAQ, AMEX and NYSE) is the sum of all short interest positions for 
all firms. We normalize aggregate short interest by the total number of shares traded in the markets.  Bloomberg 
Investment 
Bank Ranking  Ranking of investment banks and brokerage houses by Vault.  Vault Investment Bank Guide 
All- Star 
Analyst 
A dummy variable indicating whether or not the analyst appears as an All-American All-Star analyst according to the 
annual survey in Institutional Investor magazine.  Institutional Investor Magazine 
 
 Table 2 – Who Detects Corporate Fraud? 
 
This table identifies the actor that first brings the fraud to light.  Internal governance includes frauds where 
the detector is the firm (e.g. press release), company management, or the board of directors.  Analysts 
include both sell-side analysts from brokerage houses and buy-side analysts.  Non-financial-market 
regulators include industry regulators (e.g. FERC, FAA, FDA) and other government agencies (e.g., State 
attorney general’s offices). Strategic players include buyers, suppliers and competitors to the firm.  We 
identify the actor as the media if information is first revealed in a print media outlet identified through 
FACTIVA (newspaper and/or magazine) where the story does not indicate another actor as the principal 
source of information.  
 
       Count  % of Total 
Total Internal Governance     74  32.2% 
External Governance  Count of External 
Governance 
% of External 
Governance    
  Mandated Actors       
  Non-Financial Market Regulators  25 16.0%    
  Auditors  22  14.1%    
  SEC  9 5.8%    
  Total Mandated Actors  56 35.9%    
  Market Actors        
  Employees  30 19.2%     
  Media  25  16.0%     
  Analysts  23  14.7%     
  Strategic Players  11  7.1%     
  Equity Holders  5  3.2%     
  Professional Service Firms  4  2.6%     
  Short Sellers  2 1.3%     
  Total Market Actors  100 64.1%     
Total External Governance    100% 156  67.8% 
Total Cases     230       53
Table 3 – Are Short Sellers Involved in Fraud Detection? 
 
This table examines whether short interest helps to predict fraud detection. The data consists of an 
unbalanced panel of monthly observations for each company in our sample from 1994 until 2005. The 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a fraud is detected and zero otherwise. Column 1 independent 
variables are the short interest for the company one month earlier and aggregate short interest. Short 
interest and aggregate short interest are divided by the number of share outstanding  for (respectively) the  
firm and the market. In column 2 we interact lag short interest with whistleblower type and include but do 
not report controls for the type of fraud (restatement dummy, self-dealing dummy, other non-financial 
illegal activity dummy, misrepresentations on financial statements dummy, failure to disclose dummy). In 
column 3, we include firm fixed effects, and do not include controls for the type of fraud. In column 4, each 
row is a separate logistic regression where the logistic is only fitted for that type of detector. (Column 4 
allows the sensitivity of detection to the controls to vary by detector type.) All regressions include Newey-
West Standard Errors to correct for serial correlation in the panel. ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  We exclude two observations for where shortsellers are identified as 
the fraud detector.   
 
Logistic Regression 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Fraud Detected in Period 
  1 2 3  4 
Lag Short Interest (All)  3.53***      4.92* 
 (0.94)      (2.90) 
Lag Short Interest (Auditors)    4.06**  2.93  1.24 
   (1.60)  (4.37)  (6.77) 
Lag Short Interest (Equity Holders)    -15.36  -20.84  -53.94 
   (14.95)  (35.27)  (36.26) 
Lag Short Interest (Analysts)    7.29  10.87  11.68** 
   (5.18)  (8.18)  (4.80) 
Lag Short Interest (Strategic Players)    6.63**  12.17*  13.32*** 
   (3.17)  (6.48)  (4.83) 
Lag Short Interest (Media)    7.18**  7.41  7.87* 
   (3.41)  (4.90)  (4.78) 
Lag Short Interest (SEC)    7.39  10.41  7.93 
   (11.76)  (16.50)  (21.37) 
Lag Short Interest (Non Financial Market 
Regulators)   -3.60  -4.83  -7.81 
   (5.92)  (11.05)  (9.08) 
Lag Short Interest (Employees)    1.61  2.30  2.80 
   (1.95)  (3.10)  (2.85) 
Lag Short Interest (Lawyers, Insurance)    4.82  7.77  5.31 
   (3.27)  (7.36)  (4.24) 
Aggregate Market Short / Shares Market  138.4***  140.1***  165.1***  Varies 
  (21.65) (22.01) (26.71)   
Pseudo  R-Square  0.037 0.042 0.038  Varies 
Observations  14546 14546 13594 from 418 to 
14546 
Included Whistleblower Type Effects  No  Yes  No  No 
Included Dummies for Restated  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Included Type of Fraud Dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Included Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
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Table 4 – Who Detects Corporate Fraud after Accounting for Probable Detections 
by Short Sellers 
 
This table revises our original counts for fraud detectors (column 2) with new estimates (column 3) after 
reclassifying the fraud detector for eight observations where we found significant shortselling surrounding 
fraud detection (figure 1). The median durations of the frauds (columns 5 and 6) are in months, based on 
the class period, and capped at a maximum duration of 3 years. The median adjusted duration column is 
based on a regression (not presented) of duration on type of actor, including a dummy for financial 
restatements, and for the nature of the fraud (self-dealing, non-accounting related illegal activity, financial 
misrepresentations, and failure to disclose). 
 
  
Panel A – Frequency and Duration 
Fraud Detector  














Mandated Actors          
Non-Financial Market 
Regulators 
25 25 16.0% 13.3  14.7 
Auditors 22  21  13.5%  14.7  13.9 
SEC 9  9  5.8%  21.2  20.4 
Total Mandated Actors  56  55  35.3%  15.8  16.4 
          
Market Actors          
Analysts 23  21  13.5%  8.4  10.8 
Short Sellers  2  10  6.4%  10.5  12.3 
Strategic Players  11  10  6.4%  13.3  15.5 
External Equity Holders  5  5  3.2%  15.9  15.2 
Employees 30  30  19.2%  20.9  22.9 
Media 25  21  13.5%  21.0  20.2 
Insurance, Plaintiff Law Firms  4  4  2.6%  31.4  30.8 
Total Market Actors  100  101  64.7%  15.0  15.5 
Overall Totals  156  156    15.0   
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Table 5 – Does the Distribution of Fraud Detectors Vary With the Nature of the 
Fraud, Industry, and Settlement Amount? 
 
This table explores the robustness of the distribution of fraud detectors controlling for other factors.  Panel 
A breaks down the fraud by whether they involved self-dealing, other illegal activities, or if the fraud 
primarily involved a failure to disclose (about the past or the future) or financial misrepresentations (about 
the past or the future).  Panel B breaks down the revised distribution of fraud detectors by whether the fraud 
required the firm to file restated financial statements with the SEC or not.  The median duration is the 
median for the category.  Panel C breaks down the revised distribution of fraud detectors by whether the 
company is regulated or not.   The median duration is the median for the category. Panel D explores 
whether the distribution is influenced by the settlement amount. 
 
 
Panel A – Breakdown by Type of Fraud 





































Market Actors      


















External Equity Holders  9.1% 




















Professional Service  18.2% 
(2)  -  2.2% 
(2)  - 
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Panel B – Breakdown by Whether Firm Restated Financials or Not 
  Not Restated Financials  Restated Financials 
  Count Frequency  % Count Frequency  % 
Mandated Actors      
Non-Financial  Market  Regulators  13 22.0% 12 12.4% 
Auditors 3  5.1%  18  18.6% 
SEC  0 0.0% 9 9.3% 
Total  Mandated   27.1%  40.3% 
Market Actors      
Analysts 12  20.3%  9  9.3% 
Short  Seller  4 6.8% 6 6.2% 
Strategic  Players  5 8.5% 5 5.2% 
External Equity Holders  2  3.4%  3  3.1% 
Employees  10 16.9% 20 20.6% 
Media  8  13.6% 13 13.4% 
Professional Service Firms  2  3.4%  2  2.1% 
Total  Market   72.9%  59.7% 
Total (% of sample)  59  37.8%  97  62.2% 
Median Duration  11.6    16.7   
Chi-Squared Test for Median Equivalence of Restated vs NonRestated : χ(1) = 2.72   pvalue = 0.099 
Panel C  - Breakdown by Whether Firm in Regulated Industry or Not 
  Not Regulated Industry  Regulated Industry 
  Count Frequency  % Count Frequency  % 
Mandated Actors      
Non-Financial Market Regulators  4  6.3%  21  23.6% 
Auditors  10 15.9% 11 12.4% 
SEC  3 4.8% 6 6.7% 
Total  Mandated   27.0%  42.7% 
Market Actors      
Analysts  11 17.5% 10 11.2% 
Short  Seller  6 9.5% 4 4.5% 
Clients, Competitors, Suppliers  4  6.3%  6  6.7% 
External Equity Holders  3  4.8%  2  2.2% 
Employees  14 22.2% 16 18.0% 
Media  8  12.7% 13 14.6% 
Insurance, Plaintiff Law Firms  1  1.6%  3  3.4% 
Total  Market   73.0%  57.3% 
Total  64  92  
Median Duration  14.1    16.0   
Chi-Squared Test for Median Equivalence of Regulated vs Non-Regulated: χ(1) = 0.66   pvalue = 0.416 
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Panel D –Breakdown by Settlement Amount 








  Count Freq  % Count Freq  % Count Freq  % Count Freq  % 




25 16.0% 18 15.4% 16 17.4%  9  21.4% 
Auditors  21 13.5 16 13.7 11 12.0  2  4.8 
SEC  9 5.8 6 5.1 2 2.2 0 0.0 
Total  Mandated    55 35.3% 40 34.2% 29 31.5% 11 26.2% 
Market Actors          
Analysts  21 13.5 16 13.7 13 14.1  6  14.3 
Short  Seller  10  6.4 8 6.8 8 8.7 5  11.9 
Strategic  Players  10  6.4 8 6.8 3 3.3 1 2.4 
External Equity 
Holders  5 3.2 4 3.4 4 4.4 2 4.8 
Employees  30 19.2 22 18.8 20 21.7  7  16.7 
Media  21 13.5 17 14.5 14 15.2  9  21.4 
Professional 
Service  4 2.6 2 1.7 1 1.1 1 2.4 
Total  Market  101  64.7% 77 65.8% 63 68.5% 31 73.8% 
Overall Total  156  117   92    42       58
Table 6  – Does Fraud Detection involve Other Actors? 
 
For each case detected by an original fraud detector, we identify in the columns to the right “to whom” the 
whistle was blown (i.e. the next actor who played a central role in bringing the fraud to light).  The 
percentages sum to 100 across the columns and reflect the relative importance for the original fraud 
detector in that row.  The “public” category indicates that the original detector did not involve any other 
actor in bringing the fraud to light. The “firm” category captures situations where the firm comes forward 






To whom is the whistle blown? 
 
  Media  Non Fin’l 
Regulator  SEC Lawyers  Analyst  Other 
External  Public Firm 






(3)  -- --  4.0% 




Auditors  4.8% 
(1)  --  -- -- --  --  --  95.2% 
(20) 
SEC  22.2% 




Market Actors             
Analysts  57.1% 




Short Sellers  60.0% 
(6)  -- --  --  20.0% 
(2) 
20.0% 











(4)  --  -- -- --  --  --  20.0% 
(1) 







(4)  --  3.3% 
(1)  --  36.7% 
(11) 
Media   4.8% 
(1)  -- -- --  --  95.2% 
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Table 7 – Source of Information  
For each case, we assess where the information that is lead to the revelation originates from.  We first 
categorize whether the information comes from SEC Financial Market Disclose, usually via quarterly 
reporting. Then, for those cases in which the information is not from SEC disclosure rules, we break down 
whether the information is collectible public information (e.g., a survey by analysts), regulatory discovery 
findings, or information from internal firm operations. Percentages of each of these categories are presented 














Firm  Count 










(1)  25 
Auditors  9.5% 
(2)  -- --  90.5% 
(19)  21 
SEC  100.0% 
(9)  -- -- -- 9 
Market Actors       
Analysts  66.7% 
(14) 
19.0% 
(4)  --  14.3% 
(3)  21 
Short Seller  70.0% 
(7) 
10.0% 
(1)  --  20.0% 
(2)  10 











(4)  -- --  20.0% 
(1)  5 
Employees  3.3% 
(1)  --  10.0% 
(3) 
86.7% 
(26)  30 







(4)  21 
Professional Service  50.0% 
(2) 
50.0% 
(2)  -- -- 4 







(58)  156 
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Table 8 – What is the Impact of Fraud Detection on an Analyst’s Career? 
 
Panel A: Unconditional Probability of Being All American All-Star Analyst 
Panel A presents the unconditional probability that an analyst who reveals a fraud is an “All-Star” analyst 
in the year prior to fraud detection, as categorized by Institutional Investor magazine. We categorize 
analysts as Yes or No for the rating if we know the analyst name detecting the fraud and use the category  
Unknown if no specific name is provided for the analyst.  
.  
 
Unconditional Probability of Being All-Star Analyst 







Panel B: Transition Probability of Being All American All-Star Analyst 
Panel B presents the transition probability of an analyst remaining in their All-Star category or moving to 
other All-Star categories in the year after the fraud detection for each ex ante All-Star category. The blank 
fields indicate that no analysts who were in the Yes or Unknown All-Star categories moved to a different 
category. 
 
Transition Probability of Moving All-Star Categories - Year Prior to Fraud to Year After 
 Superstars  After     
Superstar Before  No  Yes  Unknown 
No  0.818 0.061 0.121 
Yes  -- 1 -- 
Unknown --  --  1 
     61
Table 9 – Who in the Media Detects Fraud? 
For each case in which the media is the fraud detector, the table records the newspaper or journal that 
reveals the fraud, the reporter(s) of the article, the page on which the article appears, and comments about 
the status and specialization of the reporter(s), where available. 
 
Company  News Outlet  Reporter   Article Location   Reporter Status 
Allegheny Energy  New York Times  David Barboza  page 1   
AOL Time Warner, 
Inc. 
New York Times  Gretchen 
Morgenson 




New York Times  Alex Berenson  page 1, business  staff writer, author of 
book on governance 
Halliburton 
Company 
New York Times  Alex Berenson 
and Lowell 
Bergaman 
page 1, business  staff writer, author of 
book on governance 
Sprint Corporation   New York Times  David Cay 
Johnston 







Herb Greenberg  page 1, business  staff writer, specialist 
on tech sector 
3Com  San Francisco 
Chronicle 
Herb Greenberg  page 1, business  staff writer, specialist 
on tech sector 
Broadcom 
Corporation 
Wall Street Journal  Molly Williams  C11, Heard on the 
Street 
staff writer 
Cardinal Health, Inc.  Wall Street Journal  Jonathan Weil   C1, Heard on the 
Street 
writes accounting 
column for WSJ,  
Enron Corporation  Wall Street Journal  Jonathan Weil   T1 - page 1 of 
Texas Journal  
(regional edition of 
WSJ) 
writes accounting 
column for WSJ, 
E.W. Blanch 
Holdings 
Wall Street Journal  Deborah Lohse  A 10  staff writer 




A1, B6  staff writer 
Raytheon Company  Wall Street Journal  no author       
AT&T Corporation  Business Week  Robert Barker  Investor column (p. 
264) 
 
Bausch & Lomb  Business Week  Rochelle Sharpe  p 87   
Mattel, Inc.  Business Week  Kathleen Morris  ** cover story**   
Silicon Graphics  Business Week  Robert D. Hof,  
Ira Sager,  Linda 
Himelstein 
** cover story**   
Employee Solutions  Financial World  Debra Sparks  p 52  subsequently writer 
for business week 
Apria Healthcare  Fortune  Erick Schonfeld  p 114    
Charter 
Communications 
Cable World  Mavis Scanlon  Na   
Cambrex 
Corporation 





Na Na   
Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
Cancer Letter  Na Na   
Tyco International   SEC Insight  no author    Na    Table 10 – What are the Costs and Benefits for Employee Whistle Blowing? 
 
The table indicates for each employee whistleblower the following information: company (column 1); the whistleblower name and position, whether the 
whistleblower identifies herself (column 2); whether the whistleblower was terminated, quit, or was given a job with significantly reduced responsibility (column 
3); other costs claimed by the employee (column 4); whether a lawsuit filed with potential for damages including the type of lawsuit (column 5); whether an 
outcome to the lawsuit (column 6); and other possible benefits of whistleblowing (column 7).  
 
   Costs Benefits 














Apria Healthcare, Inc.  Mark Parker, branch 
manager 
yes    yes - qui tam, 
wrongful dismissal 




Healthcare / Olsten 
[2 cases]  
Donald McLendon, 
executive of acquired firm 
yes  Couldn't find other job, financial 
stress 
yes - qui tam  yes - $35 million  avoid potential legal 
liability 
Dynegy, Inc.  Ted Beatty, management 
trainee 
yes  Couldn't find other job, forced to 
leave hometown, home broken into, 
threats and intimidation 
No   vengeance 
Endocare  Joseph Hafemann, corporate 
controller 




David Armitage, engineer  no    No    vengeance 
Healthsouth  Weston Smith, vice president  yes  Sentenced to 27 months, forced to 
pay $6.9 million 
No    avoid potential legal 
liability 
JDN Realty  William Kerley, CFO  no  Alleged loss of $19 million 
including legal and job loss costs 
yes –wrongful 
dismissal suit 
yes - $2.3 million   
Johnson & Johnson  Hector Arce  yes    yes - qui tam   no - government 
doesn't join 
 
Marsh & McLennan 
Companies, Inc. 




Northeast Utilities  George Galatis, engineer  yes  "If I had it to do over again," says 
Galatis, "I wouldn't."  Alienated by 
co-workers. 
yes - payment to 
leave likely 
yes - settlement 
amount not 
revealed 
on cover of Time 
magazine 
Quorum  Jim Alderson  yes  Lost job. Moved to 5 towns in next 
10 years. 
yes - qui tam  yes - $70 million   
Rite Aid  Joseph Speaker, senior 
finance executive 
no  Left firm a year later.  No         63
Service Corporation 
International 
Charles Albert and Thomas 
Chaney 
yes   yes  –wrongful 
dismissal suit 
no information   
Solectron Corporation  Ronald Sorisho, division 
CFO 
yes   yes  –wrongful 
dismissal suit 
no information  avoid potential legal 
liability 
Xerox Corporation  James Bingham, assistant 
treasurer 
yes  "… never get a job in Corporate 
America again," Bingham's lawyer. 
yes –wrongful 
dismissal suit 
no information  avoid potential legal 
liability 
Ann Taylor  internal unknown    Unknown         
America West Holding  Unionized maintenance 
workers 
Unknown       improve 
employment 
conditions 
Cendant Corporation  Accounting staff integrating 
newly acquired firm 
Unknown        avoid potential legal 
liability 
Ceridian   unnamed employee  Unknown         
Consol Energy  internal unknown letter to 
auditor and SEC 
Unknown        
Enterasys Networks, 
Inc. 
unnamed finance executive  Unknown         
Footstar, Inc.   Corporate Accounting group  Unknown        avoid potential legal 
liability 
Laidlaw internal  unknown  Unknown         
Nicor, Inc.  anonymous letter   Unknown         
PhyCor, Inc.  Doctors who are employees  Unknown        improve 
employment 
conditions 
SUPERVALU, Inc.  an unnamed female auditor 
fired 
Unknown        avoid potential legal 
liability 
Symbol Technologies  unknown letter to SEC  Unknown         
Tenet Healthcare 
Corporation  unnamed employee  Unknown         
Union Pacific 
Corporation Union  action  Unknown       
improve 
employment 
conditions Table 11 – Do Incentives Impact Employee Whistleblowing? Evidence from Qui-
Tam Availability 
 
This table provides a breakdown of the distribution of fraud detector for the healthcare and non-healthcare 
industries, where healthcare includes medical treatments and supporting industries including 
pharmaceuticals and manufacturers of medical supplies and equipment.    In many healthcare companies, 
the government is a significant buyer of company services, and consequently employees can possibly 
benefit from qui-tam lawsuits. The null hypothesis of the Chi-Square test is that the employee percentage of 
fraud detectors is the same for non-healthcare and healthcare industries. 
 
Panel A – Distribution of Whistle Blowers 
  Non-Healthcare Healthcare 
  Count Freq  % Count Freq  % 
Mandated Actors      
Non-Financial  Market  Regulators  23  16.3% 2 13.3% 
Auditors  19  13.5% 2 13.3% 
SEC 9  6.4%     
Market Actors      
Analysts  19  13.5% 2 13.3% 
Short Seller  10  7.1%     
Strategic Players  10  7.1%     
External Equity Holders  5  3.6%     
Employees 23  16.3%  7  46.7% 
Media  19  13.5% 2 13.3% 
Insurance, Plaintiff Law Firms  4  2.8%     
Total  141    15   
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test for Employee Distributional Equality:   χ (2) = 5.14   pvalue = 0.0234 
 
Panel B – Frivolous Cases by Industry 




Healthcare 30 19 11  36.7% 
Non-Healthcare  471 211 260  55.4% 
Total  Sample  501 230 271  54.3% 
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Table 12 – Does Auditor Involvement in Detection Change post Enron? 
 
The table breaks down the frauds along two dimensions.  The rows indicate whether the fraud in question  
required restatements  filed with the SEC for the period in question (row 1) or  did not require restatements 
(row 2).  The columns provide details about the identity of the fraud detector, and how the relevance of this 
category of detector changes over time.  Column 1 presents the percentage and count (in parentheses) of the 
156 external frauds that required restatements, while column 2 repeats the exercise for the 21 cases where 
auditors were the fraud detectors (we do not include the two accounting cases we reclassified as 
shortsellers). In Columns 3 and 4, we breakdown the auditor cases over time, column 3 indicating the cases 
raised by auditors prior to Enron, and column 4 indicating those cases post Enron. 
 
 Accounting 
Status of Fraud 
All Fraud 

























of 156 External  
= 13.55 
7 Cases  
of 73 Pre Enron 
= 9.6% 
14 Cases 
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Table 13 – Impact of SOX on Fraud Detector Distribution 
 
This table provides the distribution of external fraud detectors before and after the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley in July 2002. 
 
  Pre-SOX Post-Sox 
  Count Freq  % Count Freq  % 
Mandated  Actors      
Non-Financial  Market  Regulators  17  15.3% 8 17.8% 
Auditors 8  7.2%  13  28.9% 
SEC  5 4.5% 4 8.9% 
Total  Mandated  Actors  30 27.1% 25 55.6% 
Analysts  16  14.4% 5 11.1% 
Short Seller  10  9.0%  --  -- 
Market  Actors      
Strategic  Players  8 7.2% 2 4.4% 
External Equity Holders  4  3.6%  1  2.2% 
Employees  23  20.7% 7 15.6% 
Media 17  15.3%  4  8.9% 
Insurance, Plaintiff Law Firms  3  2.7%  1  2.2% 
Total  Market  Actors  81 72.9% 20 44.4% 
Total  111   45   
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test for Distributional Equality:   χ (8) = 28.71   pvalue = 0.004 
 
 